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Goal achieving is a commonly observed phenomenon in practice, and it plays an important role in decision
making. In this paper we investigate the impact of a target on newsvendor decisions. We take into account
the risk and model the effect of a target by maximizing the satisficing measure of a newsvendor’s profit with
respect to that target. We study two satisficing measures: i) CVaR (Conditional Value at Risk) satisficing
measure that evaluates the highest confidence level of CVaR achieving the target; and ii) entropic satisficing
measure that assesses the smallest risk tolerance level under which the certainty equivalent for exponential
utility function achieves the target. For both satisficing measures, we find that the optimal ordering quantity
increases with the target level. We determine an optimal order quantity for a target based newsvendor and
charactize its properties with respect to, for example, product’s profit margin.
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1. Introduction
Meeting a pre-specified profit target has been a key performance metric for firms. A quick search in
The Wall Street Journal with the keyword “target” returns numerous results on firms meeting or
missing financial goals. This is widely believed to affect firms’ stock prices (Rappaport 1999). For
example, in the fourth quarter of 2004, Ebay reported earnings of 23 cents per share, which missed
the target of 24 cents per share. After the report was issued, Ebay’s stock tumbled more than 11%
within a few hours (CNNMoney 2005). Despite the important role a target plays in practice, it
has not received much attention from the Operations Management research community. Our aim
is to bring new perspectives to newsvendor decisions, and to provide an alternative approach in
studying newsvendor problems that can appeal to target-attainment oriented decision makers.
The classical newsvendor model assumes that decision makers are risk neutral and maximize the
expected profit, which drives a fractile-based solution. This is a prevalent approach for scenarios
where the risks can be effectively hedged, such as when the decisions can be repeated for a large
number of times or when a firm owns many newsvendors. However, when it comes to capacity
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decisions or strategic investment decisions, i.e., those critical and irreversible, the risks cannot be
considered as negligible. To take into account the risks in such contexts, researchers have explored
alternative objectives such as minimizing a risk measure or maximizing the expected utility. Some
representative work includes Eeckhoudt et al. (1995), Ahmed et al. (2007), O¨zer et al. (2007),
Choi and Ruszczynski (2008), and Chen et al. (2009). None of these, however, take into account
goal achieving. The only exception, to the best of our knowledge, is Lau (1980), who solves the
problem of maximizing the probability of the random profit attaining a target level, which we call
attainment probability. Although intuitively appealing, the attainment probability measure focuses
on the probability of a shortfall. It ignores the magnitude of the loss, which is a critical dimension
of concern for decision making (Payne et al. 1980). Therefore, it does not fully capture the role of
a target in decision making with risk.
To incorporate the effect of a target as well as alleviate the drawbacks of attainment probability,
we undertake an alternative approach to study the impact of a target on the newsvendor’s decision
by adopting the recently developed satisficing measure (Brown and Sim 2009, Brown et al. 2012).
It is a class of risk measures that evaluate the ability of a certain metric – which is associated
with the underlying random payoff – achieving a target. In particular, we focus on two satisficing
measures that are based on the following two underlying metrics, respectively: CVaR (Conditional
Value at Risk) and Certainty Equivalent for an exponential utility function (Mas-Colell et al. 2005).
These two metrics represent two different ways decision makers perceive risks. While CVaR is
focused on downside risk, Certainty Equivalent takes into account all realizations of the underlying
randomness and hence captures the attention on full scale risk. By studying both, we are able to
generate insights for newsvendors with different risk focuses.
CVaR was developed by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002), the original definition of which
evaluates the downside risk of an uncertain cash-flow. It measures the expected value of a random
cash flow – profit, in our newsvendor context – that falls below a certain quantile value. We
call it worst-case-scenario expected profit, where “worst” is associated with a confidence level. To
incorporate the fact that people are not always risk averse, we extend the definition of CVaR such
that it also measures the expected value of the profit that is above a certain quantile value. We call
it best-case-scenario expected profit, where “best” is also associated with a confidence level. The
Certainty Equivalent for a risky alternative is the certain amount that is equally preferred to the
alternative, which reveals a decision maker’s risk attitude toward the risky alternative. Similarly,
we study the certainty equivalent for both the risk-averse and risk-seeking scenarios.
Corresponding to these two metrics, we consider CVaR satisficing measure (CSM) and entropic
satisficing measure (ESM), respectively. The former evaluates the confidence level of CVaR achiev-
ing the target and the latter assesses the risk tolerance level under which the certainty equivalent
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achieves the target. Note that it is desirable to have a CSM value as big as possible, as this suggests
that one can be highly confident about the expected profit achieving the target even if the ran-
dom profit is realized in an undesirable region. Similarly, higher ESM value is preferred because it
implies that a highly conservative decision maker can still have the certainty equivalent exceeding
the target and accept the underlying decision. As such, the objective of the newsvendor is to find
an order quantity that maximizes the CVaR (entropic) satisficing measure.
Before presenting the models and analyses, we summarize our contributions to literature. I)
We build a model that captures the effect of a target on newsvendor decisions, and with which
incorporate the decision makers’ risk attitude. Our model does not require a modeler to calibrate the
model parameters, e.g., the parameters for a utility function. Given a target, our model prescribes
an ordering strategy. II) We determine an optimal ordering quantity for a target-based newsvendor
and characterize its properties with respect to factors such as profit margin and target level. We
also compare the optimal order quantity to the well-known critcal-fractile solution that assumes
risk neutrality. III) By analyzing the newsvendor decision with both the criteria of CSM and ESM,
we find that the optimal ordering quantities under these two criteria exhibit the same properties.
This demonstrates the robustness of our model with respect to how risks are recognized. Finally,
we take one step further and show that if the target is set in a particular way, our model gives
exactly the same solution as an expected utility model does.
2. Newsvendor Decision with CVaR Satisficing Measure
In this section we investigate the quantity decision for a target-oriented newsvendor who focuses
on the downside (upside) risk of the random profit. The newsvendor decides how many units of a
product to order before the selling season. Each unit is purchased at a cost c and sold at a price
p. The random demand D is assumed to be bounded by [d, d¯]⊆<+ and without loss of generality,
continuously distributed. In this paper, we use capital letters to denote random variables and lower
case letters for their realizations. We assume that the unsatisfied demand is lost and the salvage
value for unsold items is zero. Given an order quantity y, the newsvendor’s random profit is:
V (y) =−cy+ pmin(y,D). (1)
The metric that is often used to evaluate decision alternatives with respect to the downside
(upside) risk is CVaR. This by itself, however, does not take into account goal achieving. To
capture the effect of a target, this target-oriented newsvendor aims to find the order quantity that
corresponds to the highest confidence level of the CVaR of the random profit achieving a pre-set
target. In particular, let the target profit be τ ∈<, the newsvendor solves the following problem:
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sup η
s.t. CV aRη (V (y))≥ τ
η ∈ (−1,1)
y≥ 0,
(2)
where CV aRη is defined for any random profit V as follows,
CV aRη(V ) =
{
max
a∈<
{
a+ 1
1−ηE[min{V − a,0}]
}
if η ∈ [0,1),
−CV aR−η(−V ) if η ∈ (−1,0).
(3)
When V is continuously distributed, an equivalent but more intuitive definition for CV aRη is:
CV aRη(V ) =
{
E [V |V ≤ q1−η(V )] , if η ∈ [0,1),
E [V |V ≥ q−η(V )] , if η ∈ (−1,0), (4)
where qη(V ) is the unique η-quantile of V , i.e., Prob(V ≤ qη(V )) = η.
The above definition of CVaR is an extended version based on the one proposed by Rockafellar
and Uryasev (2000, 2002). It suggests that for η ∈ [0,1), CV aRη(V ) measures the expectation of
V in the worst (1−η) case realizations, whereas for η ∈ (−1,0), it measures the expectation in the
best (1 +η) case realizations. Figure 1 provides an example to illustrate these definitions. Graph 1
in Figure 1 illustrates the PDF of the random profit V , and Graphs 2 to 6 illustrate the values of
CV aRη(V ) for η ∈ {3/4,1/3,0,−1/4,−2/3}, which are the expectations taken over the grey areas
in the graphs, e.g., CV aR3/4(V ) = 1/6. We can see that as the value of η decreases, the expectation
is taken over a more optimistic area of the profit realization, and CV aRη increases (from 1/6 to
2/3). In other words, a smaller η in the CV aRη evaluation suggests that the decision maker is less
risk averse and more optimistic about the random profit realization.
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 1: PDF
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 2: CVaR3/4
 
 
Area:1/4   
Average:1/6
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 3: CVaR1/3
 
 
Area:2/3    
Average:7/24
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 4: CVaR0
 
 
Area:1      
Average:5/12
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 5: CVaR
−1/4
 
 
Area:3/4   
Average:1/2
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
Graph 6: CVaR
−2/3
 
 
Area:1/3   
Average:2/3
Figure 1 Illustration for CVaR
Note that Problem (2) can be equivalently formulated based on the following satisficing measure
that evaluates a random profit’s risk with respect to the target profit τ .
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Definition 1 Given a target profit τ ∈ <, the CVaR satisficing measure (CSM) of the random
profit V is defined as:
ρτ (V ) =
{
sup{η ∈ (−1,1) :CV aRη(V )≥ τ} , if feasible,
−1 otherwise. (5)
By Definition 1, Problem (2) is exactly the same as the following one that maximizes the CSM
of the random profit,
ρ∗τ = max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)) . (6)
According to Definition 1, CSM measures the highest η that guarantees CV aRη achieving a
target. Take Figure 1 for illustration. Suppose the target τ = 1/2. We can see that for any η >−1/4
(e.g., Graphs 2 to 4 in Figure 1), CV aRη, the expectation over the corresponding grey area, is less
than the target. When η ≤−1/4, however, CV aRη ≥ 1/2. As such, ρτ (V ) =−1/4, is the largest η
that ensures CV aRη to achieve the target. From a risk management perspective, it is desirable for
a random payoff to have a high CSM value, as it implies that even if the uncertainties realize in a
not-so-optimistic region, the expectation can still achieve the target. In other words, the random
payoff V is more secure with respect to the target τ .
Problems (2) and (6) are two alternative formulations of the same problem. Both aim to find
the optimal order quantity so that the CVaR of the random profit can achieve the target with the
highest confidence level. In other words, the satisficing measure of the random profit resulting from
the order decision is maximized. In what follows, we first describe the solution procedure, and then
investigate the properties of the optimal ordering decisions. In discussing the properties, we follow
the framework of the problem in (6) and often talk about the optimal satisficing measures.
To solve for the optimal order quantity, we first observe that following the definition in (3),
CV aRη is non-increasing in η. Therefore, we can find the optimal solution for the problem in (2) by
performing a binary search on η. For each η ∈ (−1,1), we need to solve the following subproblem:
max
y≥0
CV aRη(V (y)). (7)
Proposition 1 below provides the solution to (7). We defer all proofs to the appendix.
Proposition 1 For any η ∈ (−1,1), we have
arg max
y≥0
CV aRη (V (y)) =
{
F−1 (ξ− ηξ) if η ∈ [0,1),
F−1 (ξ− η(1− ξ)) if η ∈ (−1,0),
where ξ = p−c
p
is called critical fractile, and F is the cumulative distribution of D.
We now proceed to examine how the target profit affects the ordering decision.
Theorem 1 Assume that τ1 ≥ τ2. Then we have: 1) ρ∗τ1 ≤ ρ∗τ2; and 2) there exists y1 ≥ y2 ≥ 0 such
that yi ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτi (V (y)), i∈ {1,2}.
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Theorem 1 part 1 shows that the newsvendor’s maximum CSM is decreasing with the target
profit. Intuitively, the same random profit will be more secure if we have a lower target, and be
riskier if we have a higher target. Consequently, the best quantity decision under a low target must
make the profit at least as secure as that under a high target.
Theorem 1 part 2 suggests that the newsvendor will order more if the target is higher. We note
that a high target is an indication of the newsvendor’s soaring ambition, which cannot be realized
unless the newsvendor places a large order. To further illustrate, we consider an extreme case.
Suppose the target is τ = (p− c)d, where d is the lower bound of the random demand. Then the
newsvendor would order exactly at d since it yields a deterministic profit of (p− c)d and ensures
the target attainment. However, if the target τ > (p− c)d, then the ordering quantity of d is no
longer optimal since the profit is consistently lower than the target. Therefore, the newsvendor has
to increase the ordering quantity.
In the newsvendor problem, an important benchmark is the risk neutral solution, yN , which
maximizes the expected profit and is known to be yN = F
−1(ξ). Theorems 2 and 3 and their corre-
sponding corollaries below investigate the relationship between yN and the target-based solution.
Theorem 2 If τ =E [V (yN)], then yN ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)).
Theorem 2 says that if the newsvendor’s target is set to be the maximum expected profit, then
the risk-neutral newsvendor solution gives the highest CSM. This is intuitive because for any other
order quantity, the risk neutral expectation of the profit is less than the target, τ = E[V (yN)]. As
such, to enable its CVaR to reach the target, it is only possible by looking at the best-case profit
realization when η < 0, whereas the risk-neutral solution can do so for η= 0. Based on Theorem 2,
we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 1. If τ ≤E [V (yN)], then ∃y∗ ≤ yN such that y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)).
2. If τ ≥E [V (yN)], then ∃y∗ ≥ yN such that y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)).
A newsvendor is said to under-order if she orders less than yN , and over-order if she orders more
than yN . Corollary 1 shows that the newsvendor under-orders when the target is lower than the
maximum expected profit, and over-orders when the target is higher than that. This is probably
because if the target is very high, then the decision maker may just take the chance and “pray
for odds”, and hence over-orders. If the target is low, however, then it makes more sense to be
conservative, and hence under-orders.
So far we have treated the target profit as exogenously given, without considering how it is set
and what form it takes. In comparison to the substantial body of empirical research on the effect
of target (e.g., Brown and Tang 2006), the research on how people form their targets is rather
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scant. To the best of our knowledge, the only descriptive research is a field study by Merchant and
Manzoni (1989), who show that in practice the targets are usually set in a way such that they can
be achieved in eighty to ninety percent of the time. The other stream of research, which can be
considered as a guide on how to set targets normatively, mainly focus on how the challenging level
of the goal impacts employee performance (e.g., Tubbs 1986, Locke & Latham 2002, and Fried
& Slowik, 2004). While how the targets should be set is an interesting issue to investigate, it is
beyond the scope of this paper. It, however, can certainly be a future research direction. In what
follows, we first follow the path of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) and make the assumption that the
newsvendor’s target profit is determined by following simple heuristics, and study the property of
optimal order quantities. We then show that if the target is set in a particular way, our model
provides the same solution as a model maximizing CVaR does.
Theorem 3 Assume τ = (p − c) × α (D), where α(D) is a positive value that depends on the
knowledge of D alone. Then there exists a threshold value ζ, which increases with α (D), such that:
(i) if p−c
p
≥ ζ, we can find y∗ ≤ yN , where y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)); and (ii) if
p−c
p
≤ ζ, we can find
y∗ ≥ yN , where y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)).
By Theorem 3, if the target is proportional to the unit marginal profit as well as a demand-related
factor, the newsvendor will under-order high-profit products and over-order low-profit products.
Here τ = (p−c)×α (D) can be considered as a simple and intuitive heuristic for the newsvendors to
set their targets. For example, a newsvendor can simply treat the random demand as a deterministic
one with the value equal to its expectation. After taking 20% off as the cost of uncertainty, her
target profit is set to be τ = 80% × (p − c)E [D]. Hence, for this newsvendor we have α (D) =
0.8E [D]. Likewise, the target can be τ = 0.6(p−c)×m (D), where m (D) is the mode of the demand
distribution.
It is worth noting that high-profit and low-profit are benchmarked against the threshold value
ζ. From Theorem 3, a high value of α (D) leads to a larger ζ, implying a wider range of products
to be considered as low-value. This is probably because the newsvendor with higher α (D) has a
higher target profit and is more ambitious. As such, she is more likely to consider a product as
low-profit and over-order it. We highlight this conclusion in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 A newsvendor with a higher target to achieve is more likely to overorder.
Corollary 3 below further illustrates Theorem 3 by showing the specific form of ζ when the
demand is uniformly distributed.
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Corollary 3 Assume the random demand D is uniformly distributed in [d, d¯]⊂<+, and τ = (p−
c)×α (D), where α(D) is a positive value that depends on the knowledge of D alone. Then there
exists a threshold value
ζU = 2× α (D)− d
d¯− d (8)
such that if p−c
p
≥ ζU , we can find y∗ ≤ yN with y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)); and if
p−c
p
≤ ζU , we can find
y∗ ≥ yN with y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)).
By (8) we can see that the threshold value ζU increases with α(D). To have a more concrete
example, let d= 100, d¯= 200, α (D) = kE [D] = 150k with k being a constant that falls in the range
of (0,1). Hence, the decision maker forms the target profit as τ = 150k(p− c). A start-up company
may set a conservative target such that k has a low value of 80%, i.e., τ = 80%(p− c)E [D]. From
(8) we know that the threshold value is ζU = 0.4. That is, the company would consider a product to
be a high-profit one and under-order it if and only if the product has p−c
p
> 0.4. In contrast, if the
company is well-established and has higher tolerance for risk, it may set a more ambitious target
such that k = 90%, i.e., τ = 90%(p− c)E [D]. Similarly we can get the threshold value ζU = 0.7,
which means that a product is considered high-profit if and only if p−c
p
> 0.7. Figure 2 provides a
clear illustration on how the under-order and over-order regions change with the threshold values.
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Figure 2 Ordering behavior for high and low profit products.
While the focus of our paper is not on how to set the target, our results in Proposition 2 below
show that if the target is set in a particular way, the decision prescribed by our target-based
framework is the same as the one that maximizes CV aRη for a given η. While abundant literature
(e.g., Locke & Latham 1990, Rasch and Tosi 1992, and Barrick et al. 1993) promotes using goal
achieving to incentivize employees’ performance, an important issue is whether the employees’
decisions, which are driven by the target, would also optimize the firm’s objective (e.g., Shi et al.
2010). For example, if the firm aims to maximize the CV aRη of the random profit, then in the
target-based framework, is there a way for the firm to use a target to drive the managers to a
decision that maximizes CV aRη? Proposition 2 sheds some light on this issue.
Proposition 2 With the target value τ = max
y≥0
CV aRη(V (y)), we have arg max
y≥0
ρτ (V (y)) =
arg max
y≥0
CV aRη(V (y)).
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According to Proposition 2, if the firm sets the target level to be the optimal CV aRη value that
can be achieved, the manager’s decision based on the CSM decision criterion will be exactly the
same as the solution maximizing the CV aRη criterion.
3. Newsvendor with ESM
In this section we study the ordering decision of a target-oriented newsvendor who is concerned
about the full scale risk of the random profit. For conciseness, we only present the satisficing
measure modelling framework as in (6). The satisficing measure we consider here is the entropic
satisficing measure (ESM), which is focused on certainty equivalent achieving the target. Different
from CSM, which considers only the worst/best case expectation, ESM captures all possible real-
izations of the random profit and hence represents decision makers’ preference over the full scale.
By assuming an exponential utility function, we define the ESM as follows:
Definition 2 Given a target profit τ , the entropic satisficing measure (ESM) of the random profit
V is defined as:
ρEτ (V ) =
{
sup{η :Cη(V )≥ τ} , if feasible,
−∞ otherwise, (9)
where Cη(V ) is defined as:
Cη(V ) =
{− 1
η
lnE [exp(−ηV )] if η 6= 0,
E [V ] if η= 0. (10)
In Definition 2, Cη is the certainty equivalent for the well-accepted exponential utility function,
uη(x) = 1−exp(−ηx), where η represents the risk aversion level of a decision maker. As η increases,
the utility function becomes more concave (see the left panel of Figure 3). This implies that the
decision maker is more risk averse. By Definition 2, ESM represents the highest degree of risk
aversion such that the certainty equivalent is above the target. To illustrate, let us take the random
payoff V with CDF as in Figure 1 for example. We plot its certainty equivalent, Cη(V ), in the
right panel of Figure 3 with varying η. Suppose we have a target τ = 0.2, then ρEτ (V ) = 20, which
implies that for any decision maker who has an exponential utility with η≤ 20, Cη(V )≥ τ , i.e., V
is more appealing than the certain value that is equal to the target profit.
The newsvendor problem under the ESM framework is to find an ordering quantity such that
ρEτ is maximized. From Definition 2 we can see that, a random profit with higher ρ
E
τ attracts a
greater subset of individuals who are willing to prefer the random profit over the target profit
with certainty. In other words, an optimal newsvendor decision under the ESM framework is one
such that this decision is favorable even to decision makers with very low risk tolerance level. This
decision criterion can be especially useful for group decision making where each group member
may have a different level of risk tolerance.
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Figure 3 Illustration for ESM
Interestingly, we show that for newsvendors under ESM, all the results in Section 2 still hold.
Theorem 4 summarizes the results. We especially highlight that if the target is set to be the
maximum certainty equivalent (equivalently, expected utility) that can be achieved, the ordering
decision prescribed by our ESM framework is the same as the one maximizing the expected utility.
Theorem 4 For newsvendors maximizing the entropic satisficing measure, the following holds:
1. Assume τ1 ≥ τ2. Then there must exist y1 ≥ y2 ≥ 0 such that yi ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρEτi (V (y)), i∈ {1,2}.
2. If τ is greater than (equal to, or less than) E [V (yN)], then we can find y∗ greater than (equal
to, or less than, respectively) yN such that y
∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρEτi (V (y)).
3. If τ = α× (p− c), where α is a positive value depends on the knowledge of D alone. Then
∃ζ ∈ [0,1] such that if p−c
p
≥ ζ, there exists y∗ ≤ yN and y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρEτi (V (y)); and if
p−c
p
≤ ζ,
there exists y∗ ≥ yN and y∗ ∈ arg max
y≥0
ρEτi (V (y)).
4. With the target value τ = max
y≥0
Cη(V (y)), we have arg max
y≥0
ρEτ (V (y)) = arg max
y≥0
Cη(V (y)).
Comparing the results in Theorem 4 and those in Section 2, we see that under CSM and ESM
(which are two different ways to capture risks), the findings on the effect of target are the same.
This suggests that our target-based newsvendor model is robust on how decision makers recognize
risks.
4. Computational Analysis
In this section we conduct a numerical study to compare the ordering decisions using our target
based approaches (maximizing CSM and ESM) with those from maximizing expected profit, max-
imizing attainment probability, and the model of mean-variance analysis which is formulated by
Choi et al. (2008) as follows:
min E
[
(V (y)−E[V (y)])2
]
s.t. E [V (y)]≥ τ (11)
y≥ 0.
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As such, altogether we compare five models with different decision criteria. We let the demand
follow a discrete uniform distribution over {1,2, . . . ,100}. Note that for a given demand, a newsven-
dor instance can be characterized by the selling price and the critical-fractile. To capture a wide
range of scenarios, we generate 50 newsvendor instances. For each instance, the price is randomly
sampled from the distribution U [10,20], and the critical fractile from U [0.2,0.8]. For the models
involving a target profit, we set the target τ = ϕmaxy≥0E[V (y)], where ϕ measures how far the
target is away from the maximum expected profit. We have ϕ∈ {0.7,0.8,0.9,1.1,1.2,1.3}. For each
instance, we first find the optimal ordering quantity for each of the five models, and then compare
the performances of the optimal decisions with respect to different performance measures. Note
that computational complexity is not an issue for the newsvendor problem because it involves only
a one dimensional search if a closed form solution is unavailable. We do not take the expected
utility approach for comparison as it is unclear what utility function to use, and hence a fair com-
parison is hard to achieve. Even with the commonly used exponential utility, u(x) = 1− exp(−ηx),
the solution is sensitive to the risk averse parameter η. For example, with the current demand
distribution, if p= 12 and c= 6, the optimal ordering quantity will be 44 if η= 0.001, 20 if η= 0.01,
5 if η= 0.1, and 1 if η= 1.
Table 1 shows the average performance of all the 50 instances for each target level specified by ϕ.
Note that when ϕ> 1, the mean-variance model in (11) is infeasible so we provide the solutions for
this model only for ϕ≤ 1. Here Expected Loss (EL) is the expected value of the loss with respect to
the target; Conditional Expected Loss (CEL) is the expected value of the loss conditioning on that
there is a strictly positive loss. Value at Risk (VaR) is the threshold value that the newsvendor’s
loss does not exceed with a specified probability level. Note that for EL, CEL, and VaR, low values
are desirable because they all measure losses.
We first observe that the optimal ordering decision for the attainment probability model is the
most conservative one. Compared to the optimal solutions for other models, it gives the lowest
expected profit, standard deviation, expected loss, conditional expected loss, and VaR. This is
because the optimal solution of the attainment probability model, τ/(p− c) (Lau 1980), is one
such that the profit can never exceed τ . This is very conservative in nature. But for other models
involving targets, we require the expected profit (mean variance model), conditional expected profit
(CSM model), or certainty equivalent (ESM model) to be no less than the target. Therefore, the
optimal decisions of these models must not be as conservative as that in the attainment probability
model.
In the low target scenarios (ϕ< 1), the mean-variance model gives the second most conservative
solution. The reason is that the optimal solution for this model is such that the expected profit is
equal to the target (Choi et al. 2008). However, the two satisficing models have optimal solutions
Chen et al.: The Impact of a Target on Newsvendor Decisions
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Approach
Criterion
ϕ Expected Standard Attainment
EL CEL
VaR VaR
profit deviation probability @ 95% @ 99%
0.7
Expected profit 223 246 67.42% 81 241 258 318
Attainment probability 132 65 81.78% 27 137 47 106
Mean variance 158 91 79.30% 33 151 80 139
CSM 203 159 74.10% 51 190 158 217
ESM 196 146 75.38% 47 182 140 199
0.8
Expected profit 223 246 65.88% 89 252 258 318
Attainment probability 146 78 79.16% 35 156 64 123
Mean variance 180 120 75.54% 47 179 113 173
CSM 214 189 70.28% 68 218 191 250
ESM 211 180 71.08% 64 211 179 238
0.9
Expected profit 223 246 64.28% 98 263 258 318
Attainment probability 159 92 76.40% 45 176 81 141
Mean variance 202 158 71.10% 65 212 157 216
CSM 221 218 66.58% 86 247 225 284
ESM 220 214 67.00% 84 244 219 279
1.1
Expected profit 223 246 61.20% 116 285 258 318
Attainment probability 181 120 71.10% 67 215 114 174
CSM 223 254 60.40% 120 291 270 329
ESM 221 275 58.58% 131 304 297 356
1.2
Expected profit 223 246 59.70% 126 297 258 318
Attainment probability 190 135 68.50% 80 235 131 190
CSM 222 262 58.22% 134 308 280 340
ESM 215 298 54.88% 155 333 331 390
1.3
Expected profit 223 246 58.02% 136 307 258 318
Attainment probability 198 150 65.80% 94 254 148 207
CSM 221 270 55.98% 149 324 290 350
ESM 207 319 51.14% 181 359 362 421
EL=Expected Loss; CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
Table 1 Performance of Various Newsvendor Models
with η greater than zero. A positive η under CSM suggests that CV aRη reaches the target, whereas
under ESM this implies the certainty equivalent achieving the target. As such, the expected profit
under both satisficing measures should be larger than the target.
Compared to the risk-neutral model that maximizes the expected profit, for CSM and ESM,
when the target is smaller than E[V (yN)], the decrease in the target results in a reduction in the
expected profit as well as the standard deviation and the loss-related performance measures (EL,
CEL, and VaR). However, the decrease in the profit (maximum at 12%, 196 vs. 223) is much more
mild than that in the standard deviation and other loss related measures (maximum at 46%, 228
vs. 118). On the other hand, when the target is larger than E[V (yN)], an increase in the target
is associated with a decrease in the expected profit but an increase in the standard deviation and
the loss-related measures. Similarly, the profit reduction is relatively mild (maximum at 7%, 207
vs. 223) while the loss-related measures increase quickly (maximum at 40%, 362 vs. 258). This
suggests that compared to the risk-neutral model, CSM and ESM perform relatively well when the
target is low.
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Finally, as the value of ϕ approaches to one (from both sides), we observe that the performance
gap between different models is reduced. The reason is that as the target moves close to the max-
imum expected profit, all target based models (except the attainment probability model) provide
solutions close to the risk neutral one. As such, the difference becomes smaller.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we incorporate the concept of achieving a target profit in newsvendor decision
making with risk. By adopting the concept of satisficing measure (Brown et al. 2012), we study
two measures: 1) CVaR satisficing measure (CSM) which measures the highest confidence level η
which guarantees CV aRη achieving the target; and 2) entropic satisficing measure (ESM) which
measures the smallest risk tolerance level under which the certainty equivalent for an exponential
utility function achieves the target.
We provide an easy solution method to find the optimal quantity for the CSM framework. On the
other hand, the optimal decision for ESM can be found numerically with very mild effort. For both
the two satisficing measures we find that i) the optimal order quantity increases with the target; ii)
the newsvendor orders more than the risk neutral solution sometimes and order less other times,
depending on the target level; and iii) if the target is proportional to the unit marginal profit and
is also affected by only one other demand related factor, then the newsvendor over-orders the low-
profit products and under-orders the high-profit products. While these results are obtained based
on continuously distributed demand, they can be easily extended to the non-continuous case by
redefining the inverse function of the demand probability distribution. Our results are consistent
with the behavioral observation made by multiple studies (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Benzion
et al. 2008, Bolton and Katok 2008, and Bostian et al. 2008). Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) argue
that “new techniques may be required to correctly optimize these systems”. The consistency of our
theoretical results and the existing behavioral observations suggest that our modelling framework
may provide a potential direction in looking for new techniques. Nevertheless, we need to be careful
about interpreting the connection between our results and the behavioral observations. After all,
there is no evidence suggesting that the subjects in these experiments are in fact subconsciously
setting a target to reach. What we do establish, however, is that if reaching a target is the decision
maker’s goal, then our paper prescribes the best decisions they can make as well as describes how
the decisions should change with the targets.
Most inventory models up to date focus on the absolute performance such as the expected
profit. With ample evidence (e.g., Brown and Tang 2006) suggesting that managers are more
concerned about achieving a target, our target-based framework can appeal to a large group of
target-attainment oriented decision makers and open a new direction for future research. We hope
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that our work would motivate increasing research interest along this avenue. We believe that it is
worthwhile extending this framework to other operations management models to investigate how
a target affects decision making. It would also be interesting to study how managers form their
targets in practice. Are there any heuristics that decision makers can follow or they simply use their
intuition? Though past research has highlighted the role of target, little work has touched upon
target formation. Although in this paper we proposed an intuitive heuristic for target formation,
we expect that more research remains to be done in this direction. Finally, while our theoretical
results are consistent with the existing behavioral observations in laboratory experiments, it is
unclear whether the subjects in those experiments are subconsciously setting a target to achieve.
Further investigation is needed along these lines.
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Proof of Proposition 1
For the case of η ∈ [0,−1), the result can be referred to Chen et al. (2009). Here we just discuss on
the case of η ∈ (−1,0), where
CV aRη (V (y)) = −CV aR−η (−V (y))
= −max
a∈<
{
a+
1
1 + η
E [min{−V (y)− a,0}]
}
= min
a∈<
{
a+
1
1 + η
E
[
(pmin(y,D)− cy− a)+
]}
= min
a∈<
g(y, a),
where g(y, a) is defined as
g(y, a) = a+
1
1 + η
E
[
(pmin(y,D)− cy− a)+
]
= a+
1
1 + η
(∫ y
0
(pz− cy− a)+ dF (z) + (py− cy− a)+ (1−F (y))
)
.
For any given y≥ 0, we discuss on the three different cases.
1. a<−cy. In this case, g(y, a) = a+ 1
1+η
E [(V ((y)− a)], ∂g
∂a
= η
1+η
< 0.
2. −cy≤ a≤ py− cy. In this case, we have
g(y, a) = a+
1
1 + η
(∫ y
cy+a
p
(pz− cy− a)dF (z) + (py− cy− a) (1−F (y))
)
,
∂g
∂a
=
F
(
cy+a
p
)
+ η
1 + η
.
3. a> py− cy. In this case, g(y, a) = a, ∂g
∂a
= 1> 0.
Therefore, let a∗(y) = arg mina∈< g(y, a), it should satisfy −cy ≤ a∗(y) ≤ py − cy. Hence, in the
following discussion it suffices to only consider a∈ [−cy, py− cy], which implies (cy+ a)/p∈ [0, y].
If y < F−1(−η), ∂g
∂a
≤ F (y)+η
1+η
< 0, a∗(y) = py− cy, CV aRη(V (y)) = py− cy, and
∂CV aRη(V (y))
∂y
= p− c > 0.
If y≥ F−1(−η), by FOD, a∗(y) = pF−1(−η)− cy,
CV aRη(V (y)) =−cy+ 1
1 + η
(∫ y
F−1(−η)
pzdF (z) + py(1−F (y))
)
,
∂CV aRη(V ((y))
∂y
=−c+ p(1−F (y))
1 + η
.
By FOD, the maximizer of CV aRη(V ((y)) is y
∗ = F−1
(
1− c
p
(1 + η)
)
= F−1 (ξ− η(1− ξ)).
Q.E.D.
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Preliminary Lemmas 1 to 3
We now introduce Lemmas 1 to 3, which are used for subsequent proof of theorems.
Lemma 1 Given a random profit V and a target profit τ ∈<, ρτ (V ) = 1 if and only P (V ≥ τ) = 1.
Proof. If P (V ≥ τ) = 1, ∀η ∈ (0,1),
CV aRη (V ) = max
a∈<
{
a+
1
1− ηE[min{V − a,0}]
}
≥ τ + 1
1− ηE[min{V − τ,0}]
= τ,
where the second equality follows from P (V ≥ τ) = 1. Therefore, ρτ (V ) = 1.
If P (V ≥ τ)∈ [0,1), denote δ= P (V ≤ τ), then we have δ ∈ (0,1], 1− δ
2
∈ [1/2,1), and
CV aR1− δ2 (V ) = maxa∈<
(
a+
2
δ
E [min{V − a,0}]
)
= max
a∈<
{a+h(a)} ,
with h(a) = 2
δ
E [min{V − a,0}]≤ 0. For a< τ , a+h(a)≤ a< τ . For a= τ , a+h(a) = τ +h(τ)< τ ,
where the strict inequality follows from P (V ≥ τ)< 1. For a> τ ,
a+h(a) = a+
2
δ
(∫ τ
−∞
(z− a)dP(V ≤ z) +
∫ a
τ
(z− a)dP(V ≤ z)
)
≤ a+ 2
δ
((τ − a) · δ+ 0)
= 2τ − a
< τ.
Therefore, we must have CV aR1− δ2 (V ) = maxa∈<{a+ h(a)}< τ . It is obvious that CV aRη(V ) is
nonincreasing in η, hence, ρτ (V ) = sup{η ∈ (−1,1) :CV aRη(V )≥ τ}< 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 Given a random profit V and a target profit τ ∈<, ρEτ (V ) =∞ if and only P (V ≥ τ) =
1.
Proof. If P (V ≥ τ) = 1, we can easily check that Cη (V )≥ τ for all η. Therefore, ρEτ (V ) =∞.
If P (V ≥ τ)< 1, there exists ∆< τ such that P (V ≤∆) = δ ∈ (0,1]. Denote the upper bound of
V as v¯. Observe that
lim
η→∞
Cη (V ) = lim
η→∞
−1
η
lnE [exp(−ηV )]
≤ lim
η→∞
−1
η
ln (δ exp(−η∆) + (1− δ) exp(−ηv¯))
= lim
η→∞
−1
η
ln (exp(−η∆)(δ+ (1− δ) exp(−η(v¯−∆))))
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= ∆ + lim
η→∞
−1
η
ln (δ+ (1− δ) exp(−η(v¯−∆)))
= ∆ + lim
η→∞
−1
η
ln(δ)
= ∆
< τ,
where the second last equality follows from v¯ > τ >∆. Therefore, ρτ (V )<∞. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Assume u1, u2, and f are nondecreasing convex functions from < to <, such that
u1(w) = f(u2(w)), ∀ w ∈<. Then there exists y1 ≥ y2 ≥ yN , such that yi ∈ arg maxy≥0E [ui(V (y))],
i∈ {1,2}.
Proof. We first show that y1 ≥ y2. For i∈ {1,2}, denote ti(y) =E [ui (V (y))]. Then yi is a maximizer
of ti(·) on <+, i.e., ti(yi)≥ ti(y) for all y≥ 0, i∈ {1,2}. To prove the existence of y1 ≥ y2, it suffices
to show ∀y≤ y2, t1(y)≤ t1(y2). To this end, we observe
t′1(y) =
∂
∂y
(∫ y
0
u1(pd− cy)dF (d) +u1(py− cy)(1−F (y))
)
= −c
∫ y
0
u′1(pd− cy)dF (d) + (p− c)u′1(py− cy) (1−F (y))
= −c
∫ y
0
f ′(u2(pd− cy))u′2(pd− cy)dF (d) + (p− c)f ′(u2(py− cy))u′2(py− cy) (1−F (y))
≥ s(y)t′2(y),
where s(y) = f ′(u2(py− cy))≥ 0 is a nondecreasing function. Therefore, ∀y≤ y2,
t1(y2)− t1(y) =
∫ y2
y
t′1(x)dx≥
∫ y2
y
s(x)t′2(x)dx≥
∫ y2
m1
s(x)t′2(x)dx,
where
m1 =
{
y if t′2(y)< 0
max{r≤ y2 : ∀x∈ [y, r], t′2(x)≥ 0} otherwise
and the last inequality holds since either m1 = y, or ∀x ∈ [y,m1] we have t′2(x) ≥ 0. As y2 is a
maximizer of t2(·), we can let
ni = max{r : ∀x∈ [mi, r], t′2(x)≤ 0}, i= 1,2, . . . ,N − 1,
mi+1 = max{r≤ y2 : ∀x∈ [ni, r], t′2(x)≥ 0}, i= 1,2, . . . ,N − 1,
such that y2 =mN . Therefore,
t1(y2)− t1(y) ≥
∫ y2
m1
s(x)t′2(x)dx
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=
N−1∑
i=1
(∫ ni
mi
s(x)t′2(x)dx+
∫ mi+1
ni
s(x)t′2(x)dx
)
≥
N−1∑
i=1
(
s(ni)
∫ mi+1
mi
t′2(x)dx
)
=
N−3∑
i=1
(
s(ni)
∫ mi+1
mi
t′2(x)dx
)
+ s(nN−2)
∫ mN−1
mN−2
t′2(x)dx+ s(nN−1)
∫ mN
mN−1
t′2(x)dx
≥
N−3∑
i=1
(
s(ni)
∫ mi+1
mi
t′2(x)dx
)
+ s(nN−2)
∫ mN
mN−2
t′2(x)dx
≥
N−4∑
i=1
(
s(ni)
∫ mi+1
mi
t′2(x)dx
)
+ s(nN−3)
∫ mN
mN−3
t′2(x)dx
...
≥ s(n1)
∫ mN
m1
t′2(y)dy,
where the second inequality holds since s(x) is positive nondecreasing and t′2(x) is non-positive
when x ∈ [mi, ni] and non-negative when x ∈ [ni,mi+1]; the following inequalities hold since y2 is
maximizer of t2(·) and hence
∫ mN
mi
t′2(x)dx≥ 0 for all i= 1, . . . ,N − 1.
Therefore, we get t1(y2)− t1(y)≥ s(n1)(t2(y2)− t2(m1))≥ 0 and t1(y2)≥ t1(y), ∀y ∈ [0, y2]. There-
fore, we know that there exists y1 ≥ y2 such that y1 is the maximizer of t1(·) on <+.
To show y2 ≥ yN , let u3(w) =w. Then u3 is an increasing convex function and u2(w) = u2(u3(w))
for any w. From the previous result we can know y2 ≥ yN , since y3 is the maximizer of E[u3(V (y))]
on <+. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1
For i ∈ {1,2}, denote ρi = ρ∗τi = maxy≥0 ρτi (V (y)). By the definition of CSM we can get ρ1 ≤ ρ2
since τ1 ≥ τ2.
Note that ∀y ∈ [0, d ], P(V (y) ≤ V (d)) = 1; and ∀y ∈ [d¯,∞), P(V (y) ≤ V (d¯)) = 1. Hence, there
must exist y ∈ [d, d¯] maximizing CSM. Here we just look at the existence of yi ∈ [d, d¯] to prove the
result.
First, we consider the case that −1<ρ1 ≤ ρ2 < 1. Let
yi = arg maxCV aRρi (V (y)) =
{
F−1 (ξ− ρiξ) if ρi ∈ [0,1),
F−1 (ξ− ρi(1− ξ)) if ρi ∈ (−1,0). (12)
By definition, we can easily check that ρτi (V (yi)) = ρi, and yi ∈ arg maxy≥0 ρτi (V (y)). By (12), we
have y1 ≥ y2 since ρ1 ≤ ρ2.
Secondly, consider the case that ρ1 =−1, i.e., ρτ1 (V (y)) =−1 for all y. We choose y1 = d¯. For
any y2 ∈ [d, d¯] such that ρτ2 (V (y2)) = ρ2, we have y1 ≥ y2.
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Finally, consider the case that −1< ρ1 ≤ ρ2 = 1. Let y∗ ∈ [d, d¯] be an order quantity such that
ρτ2 (V (y
∗)) = 1. By Lemma 1, P (V (y∗)≥ τ2) = 1, which implies −cy∗ + pd ≥ τ2. Hence, we have
−cd+ pd≥ τ2, and ρτ2 (V (d)) = 1. Choose y2 = d. For any y1 ∈ [d, d¯] such that ρτ1 (V (y1)) = ρ1, we
have y1 ≥ y2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
By the definition in equation (3), we can get CV aR0 (V (yN)) = E [V (yN)] = τ . Therefore,
ρτ (V (yN)) ≥ 0. Next we will prove ρτ (V (y)) ≤ 0 ∀y 6= yN . Since D is continuously distributed,
E[V (y)] is uniquely maximized at yN . Hence, ∀y 6= yN , we have CV aR0 (V (y)) = E [V (y)] <
E [V (yN)] = τ. That implies ρτ (V (y))≤ 0≤ ρτ (V (yN)). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let r(ξ) = E[V (yN)]− τ = E[V (F−1(ξ))]− (p− c)α(D). According to Corollary 1, r(ξ)≤ 0 implies
over-ordering, and r(ξ)≥ 0 implies under-ordering. If α(D)≤ d, we get for all ξ,
r(ξ) =E[V (yN)]− (p− c)×α(D)≥E[V (d)]− (p− c)d= 0.
So we just need to choose ζ = 0.
Similarly, if α(D)≥ d¯, we get r(ξ)≤ 0 for all ξ. So we just choose ζ = 1.
Now we just consider α(D)∈ (d, d¯). Recall that yN = F−1(ξ), so we have
r(ξ) = p
(∫ F−1(ξ)
d
x · dF (x) +
∫ d¯
F−1(ξ)
F−1(ξ)dF (x)
)
− cF−1(ξ)− (p− c)α(D)
= p
(∫ F−1(ξ)
d
x · dF (x)− ξα(D)
)
, (13)
r′(ξ) = p
(
F−1(ξ)−α(D)) .
Therefore r(0) = 0, r′(0)< 0, and r(ξ) is convex since r′(ξ) is increasing.
If α≥E[D], r(1)≤ 0, and r(ξ)≤ 0 for all possible ξ ∈ [0,1], so we can choose ζ = 1.
If α(D) < E[D], we have r(1) > 0, and there exists ζ ∈ (0,1) such that r(ξ) ≤ 0 for ξ ≤ ζ, and
r(ξ)≥ 0 for ξ ≥ ζ.
To prove that ζ increases with α(D), it suffices to show the monotonicity for α(D) ∈ (d,E[D]),
since we have already shown that ζ = 0 for α(D)≤ d, ζ ∈ (0,1) for α(D)∈ (d,E[D]), and ζ = 1 for
α(D)≥ E[D]. For any given α(D) ∈ (d,E[D]), by the above analysis we know that r(ξ)< (=,>)0
when ξ < (=,>)ζ. Therefore, if we increase α(D), from (13) we know that r(ξ)< 0 for all ξ < ζ,
and hence we need to increase ζ to have r(ζ) = 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 3
Following the assumption of uniform demand and the proof of Theorem 3, we have
r(ξ)
pξ
=
1
ξ
∫ d+ξ(d¯−d)
d
x
d¯− ddx−α(D)
=
1
2ξ(d¯− d)
(
(d+ ξ(d¯− d))2− d2)−α(D)
=
2d+ ξ(d¯− d)
2
−α(D).
Since p, ξ > 0, we have r(ξ)≥ 0, or over-ordering, if and only if ξ ≥ 2× α(D)−d
d¯−d = ζU . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
It is straightforward from the definition of ρτ .
Proof of Theorem 4
1) With the same argument as we made in the proof of Theorem 1, we only look at the existence
of yi ∈ [d, d¯] to prove the result.
By definition, we can easily check that maxy≥0 ρEτ1 (V (y))≤maxy≥0 ρEτ2 (V (y)) since τ1 ≥ τ2.
If maxy≥0 ρEτ1 (V (y)) =−∞, we have ρEτ1 (V (y)) =−∞ for all y. Choose y1 = d¯. For any y2 ∈ [d, d¯]
such that ρτ2 (V (y2)) = maxy≥0 ρ
E
τ2
(V (y)), we have y1 ≥ y2.
If maxy≥0 ρEτ2 (V (y)) =∞. Let y∗ ∈ [d, d¯] be an order quantity such that ρτ2 (V (y∗)) =∞. By
Lemma 2, P (V (y∗)≥ τ2) = 1, which implies −cy∗ + pd ≥ τ2. Hence, we have −cd+ pd ≥ τ2, and
ρτ2 (V (d)) =∞. Choose y2 = d. For any y1 ∈ [d, d¯] such that ρτ1 (V (y1)) = maxy≥0 ρEτ1 (V (y)), we
have y1 ≥ y2.
Now we consider the case of −∞<maxy≥0 ρEτ1 (V (y))≤maxy≥0 ρEτ2 (V (y))<∞. Given τ , let ητ be
the maximum value of the ESM, i.e., ητ = maxy≥0 ρEτ (V (y)). Further, for the case of ητ ∈ (−∞,∞),
let yτ be the maximizer of Cητ (V (y)), i.e., yτ = arg maxy≥0Cητ (V (y)).
By definition of ESM, we know yτ is also a maximizer of ESM. Observe that
yτ = arg max
y≥0
Cητ (V (y)) =

arg max
y≥0
E [− exp (−ητV (y))] , if ητ ∈ (0,∞);
arg max
y≥0
E [V (y)] , if ητ = 0;
arg max
y≥0
E [exp (−ητV (y))] , if ητ ∈ (−∞,0).
Hence, we know yτ is also a maximizer of the expectation of a utility function uτ (·), where uτ (w) =
−sign(ητ ) exp(−ητw) if ητ 6= 0, and uτ (w) =w if ητ = 0.
Since τ1 ≥ τ2, we know −∞< ητ1 ≤ ητ2 <∞. If 0< ητ1 ≤ ητ2 , uτ1(w) =− exp(−ητ1w) and uτ2(w) =
− exp(−ητ2w). Both are nondecreasing concave functions, and there exists nondecreasing concave
function f(·) such that u2(w) = f(u1(w)) for all w. Therefore, yτ2 ≤ yτ1 ≤ yN (Eeckhoudt et al.
1995).
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If ητ1 ≤ ητ2 < 0, uτ1(w) = exp(−ητ1w) and uτ2(w) = exp(−ητ2w). Both are nondecreasing convex
functions, and there exists nondecreasing convex function f(·) such that u1(w) = f(u2(w)) for all
w. Therefore, by Lemma 3, yτ1 ≥ yτ2 ≥ yN .
If ητ1 ≤ 0≤ ητ2 , then u1(·) is nondecreasing convex function while u2(·) is nondecreasing concave
function. So we get yτ1 ≥ yN ≥ yτ2 .
2) While τ = maxy≥0E [V (y)], we know ητ = 0 and yτ = yN . Others can be derived from part 1).
3) The proof is similar to that for Theorem 3.
4) It is straightforward from the definition of ρEτ . Q.E.D.
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